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Abstract
Modeling dialog as a collaborative activity
consists notably in specifying the content
of the Conversational Common Ground
and the kind of social mental state in-
volved. In previous work (Saget, 2006),
we claim that Collective Acceptance is the
proper social attitude for modeling Con-
versational Common Ground in the par-
ticular case of goal-oriented dialog. We
provide a formalization of Collective Ac-
ceptance, besides elements in order to in-
tegrate this attitude in a rational model of
dialog are provided; and finally, a model of
referential acts as being part of a collabo-
rative activity is provided. The particular
case of reference has been chosen in order
to exemplify our claims.
1 Introduction
Considering dialog as a collabora-
tive activity is commonly admitted
(Clark, 1996; Garrod and Pickering, 2004;
Cohen and Levesque, 1991;
Cohen and Levesque, 1994). Generally speaking,
modeling a particular collaborative activity re-
quires the specification of the collective intention
helds by the agents concerned and requires the
specification of the Common Ground linked to
this activity. Common Ground refers to pertinent
knowledge, beliefs and assumptions that are
shared among team members (Clark, 1996).
Thus, Common Ground is a collection of social
mental attitudes.
The Common Ground linked to the dia-
logue itself (the Conversational Common Ground,
CCG) ensures the mutual understanding of dialog
partners. The CCG enables dialog partners to
use abbreviated forms of communication and
enables them to be confident that potentially
ambiguous messages will be correctly under-
stood (Klein et al., 2005). Dialogue partners
become aligned at several linguistics aspects
(Garrod and Pickering, 2004). There is an align-
ment, for example, of the situation model, of the
lexical and the syntactic levels, even of clarity
of articulation, of accent and of speech rate.
Interactive alignment, of team members’ situation
model and of social representations, facilitates
language processing during conversation and
facilitates social interaction.
In the particular case of referent treatment, even
for daily task, which use well-known objects with
common known proper names to refer to, there is
a wide range of possible manners to describe this
object by words. To ensure mutual understanding,
humans ”associate objects with expressions
(and the perspectives they encode), or else from
achieving conceptual pacts, or temporary, flexible
agreements to view an object in a particular way”
(Brennan and Clark, 1996).
Thus, the Conversational Common Ground,
since dialog is a mediated activity, contains all
grounded elements linked to the way to com-
municate (as the necessary level of clarity of
articulation or speech rate) as well as elements
of dialog’s history such as association between
modes of presentation (linguistic objects) and
mental representations: associations as conceptual
pacts.
In previous work (Saget, 2006), we claim
that Collective Acceptance is the proper social
attitude for modeling Conversational Common
Ground in the particular case of goal-oriented
dialog. In the first part of this paper, we show
that such a modelization fits better than stronger
mental attitudes (such as shared beliefs or weaker
epistemic states based on nested beliefs). We
also show that this modelization may be consid-
ered as partly due to the subordinated nature of
goal-oriented dialog. Then, in the last part of the
paper, a formalization of Collective Acceptance
and elements are given in order to integrate this
attitude in a rational model of dialog. Finally
a model of referential acts as being part of a
collaborative activity is provided. The particular
case of reference has been chosen in order to
exemplify our claims.
2 Collective Acceptance: the proper
social attitude for modeling CCG
2.1 General claims on reference
In order to model dialog as a collabora-
tion, reference resolution has to be considered
as the ”act identifying what the speaker in-
tends to be picked out by a noun phrase”
(Cohen and Levesque, 1994). Moreover, the col-
laborative nature of reference have been brought
to the forefront (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986).
More precisely, reference is not the simple sum of
the individual acts of generating and understand-
ing, but is a collaborative activity involving dialog
partners. Thus, according to H.H. Clark et al. in
(Clark and Bangerter, 2004), these individual acts
are motivated by two interrelated goals:
• Identification: Speakers are trying to get their
addressees to identify a particular referent
under a particular description.
• Grounding: Speakers and their addresses are
trying to establish that the addressees have
identified the referent as well enough for cur-
rent purpose.
How the identification goal is achieved ?
First at all, when speaker has the intention to
refer to a particular object, he has to choose
a description of this object. Traditionally, this
choice is viewed as depending on the beliefs of
dialog participants and as depending on avail-
ability. In other words, speaker can refer with a
definite description ıx.φ(x) to an object o iff it
is in the unique available object for which φ(o)
holds. Moreover, H.H. Clark and C.R. Marshall
(Clark and Marshall, 1981) claimed that mutual
knowledge of φ(o) is necessary, if a description
should refer successfully to an object o.
For example, let’s imagine that two per-
sons, Tom and Laura, who have been to the same
school. Tom suggests to Laura: ”Shall we meet
in front of our ex-school’s basketball court”. The
choice of the description of the intented place
should be explained by the fact that Tom thinks
that the following mutual belief is part of their
common ground:
• MBelTom,Laura(frontOf(l, h)
∧ basketballCourt(h)
∧ partOf(h, g)
∧ studentAt(Tom, g)
∧ studentAt(Laura, g)),
where:
– MBi,j(φ)
1 stands for ”φ is a shared be-
lief between agents i and j, on i’s point
of view”,
– frontOf(x, y) stands for ”x is located
in front of y”,
– basketballCourt(x) stands for ”x is a
basketball court”,
– partOf(x, y) stands for ”x is part of y”,
– studentAt(x, y) stands for ”y goes or
has been at school y”.
• Tom’s choice should also be explained by the
following weaker belief state:
BelTom(MBelLaura,Tom(frontOf(l, h)
∧ basketballCourt(h)
∧ partOf(h, g)
∧ studentAt(Tom, g)
∧ studentAt(Laura, g))
where Bi(p) stands for ”i believes (that) p”.
The main assumption behind this kind of
approach is the rationality and the cooperativeness
of dialogue participants. In addition, to infer
from the fact that someone utters that p that she
must also believe that p is commonly assumed
as a general rule (Lee, 1997). Nonetheless, this
assumption is difficult to handle in practice, as
J.A. Taylor et al. have shown (Taylor et al., 1996),
mainly because of the computational complexity
involved. Furthermore, they proved that, in most
cases, nested beliefs are not necessary beyond
1See mutual belief’s definition in section 3.1
the second level of nesting (ie. what an agent
thinks another agent thinks a third agent (possibly
the first one) thinks), as long as deception is not
involved. In the particular case of reference,
deception may be involved, as the following
situation exemplify, and then may require the
handling of deeply nested belief.
Tom and Laura live both in Berlin. They
lunched at a restaurant called ”Chez Dominique”.
Following this meal, one may reasonably assume
that:
• BelLaura(name(l) =” Chez Dominique ”),
• BelTom(name(l) = ” Chez Dominique ”),
• And MBelTom,Laura(name(l) = ” Chez
Dominique ”.
We only treat the particular case of defi-
nite reference, which counts as an indica-
tion to access a mental representation of
the intended referent that is supposed to be
uniquely identifiable for the hearer. So, it can
be viewed as a result of a function.
Then, Laura left Berlin for two years. Dur-
ing this period, the restaurant changed name. Its
new name is ”Restaurant la Petite Maison”. Tom
knows it, but Laura does not know it. Thus, the
following situation holds:
• BelTom(name(l) = ” Restaurant la Petite
Maison ” ),
• BelLaura(name(l) = ” Chez Dominique ”).
The return-day Laura and Tom (who did not
leave Berlin) must lunch together. They speak by
phone in order to agree upon a time and a restau-
rant. Let’s consider the following exchange be-
tween them:
· · ·
(U1) Laura: ” Will we lunch at the restaurant
where we have been yet ? ”
(U2) Tom: ” Which one ? ”
(U3) Laura: ” Chez Dominique. ”
(U4) Tom: ” Ok. ”
· · ·
At the end of this talk, a conceptual pact of
conceptualizing the restaurant as ”the place called
Chez Dominique” is established. If we consider
that the Conversational Common Ground has to be
modelled in terms of mutual belief, the following
mutual belief has been formed, at least on Laura’s
point of view: MBelLaura,Tom(name(l) =
”Chez Dominique”). Tom’s choice of the re-
ferring expression can not be based on Tom’s
point of view on the beliefs shared with Laura,
because from MBelTom,Laura(name(l) =
”Chez Dominique”), one may infer, follow-
ing mutual belief’s definition (ie. 3.1) that
BelTom(name(l) = ”Chez Dominique ”) which
is incoherent with BelTom(name(l) = ”Restau-
rant la Petite Maison”). In fact, Tom’s choice
should be explained in terms of his nested belief:
BelTom(MBelLaura,Tom(name(l) = ”Chez
Dominique”)) and this is a case of deception.
According to previous work (Saget, 2006),
we claim that such a treatment of reference,
depending on beliefs of dialogue participants at
the first place, which may lead to computational
representation and treatment with high complex-
ity, are neither necessary, nor proper. The proper
social attitude is Collective Acceptance.
2.2 Collective Acceptance, reference and
subordinated activity
Modeling conceptual pacts in terms of belief
states implies that the literal description has to
be true, or, more precisely, consistent with dialog
partners’ beliefs (at least with shared beliefs
between dialog partners on addressee’s point of
view), in order to ensure their rationality. But
the goal of Tom and Laura, in our preceding
examples, is to determine a place in such manner
that each one identifies it correctly; then, they will
be able to meet at the correct meeting-place. Their
goal is not to establish the truth with respect to the
place in question. Actually, the establishment of
conceptual pacts is governed by the ” grounding
criterion ” (Clark and Schaefer, 1989): ” The
contributor and the partners mutually believe that
the partners have understood what the contributor
meant to a criterion sufficient for the current
purpose.” Thereby, one can establish a conceptual
pact in conflict with ones own beliefs, if this pact
enables each group member concerned to achieve
the current common goal. In the first example,
one can imagine that the basketball-court does
not exists any more, and that both Tom and Laura
know this fact. Tom’s utterance and Laura’s
agreement are still realistic.
Collective acceptance of a group of agents, in
contrast with belief, may be inconsistent with
their beliefs (individual or shared beliefs). In fact,
a description is accepted by the addressee if it
allows him to identify the intented referent and if
an inconsistent description is not an obstacle to
the realization of current goals. For example, if
Tom have to send a letter to Laura (having two
postal addresses) and say: ”Must I send you the
letter at 16 Collingham Road, London”. Even
if Laura identifies the correct place, the address
has to be correct to receive Tom’s letter. Finally,
conceptual pact is a temporary and flexible
concept, this property does not match with the
ideal of integration or agglomeration of beliefs.
How explaining the use of Collective Ac-
ceptance ? Generally, this may be partly due to a
particular aspect of goal-oriented dialog as a sub-
ordinated sub-activity. Goal-oriented dialogues
are implied by two interdependent collaborative
activities, as explained by A. Bangerter et al.:
”Dialogues, therefore, divide into two planes
of activity (Clark, 1996). On one plane, people
create dialogue in service of the basic joint
activities they are engaged in-making dinner,
dealing with the emergency, operating the ship.
On a second plane, they manage the dialogue
itself-deciding who speaks when, establishing that
an utterance has been understood, etc. These
two planes are not independent, for problems in
the dialogue may have their source in the joint
activity the dialogue is in service of, and vice
versa. Still, in this view, basic joint activities
are primary, and dialogue is created to manage
them.”2 (Bangerter and Clark, 2003). One of team
members’goals is to understand each other, in
other words to reach a certain degree of intelligi-
bility, sufficient for the current purpose.
One may distinguish between two kinds
of sub-activities: sub-activities which are sub-
parts of another activity (thus, which transcripts
the compositionality of basic activities) and
sub-activities in service of another activity,
2This claim must be extended to other kind of basic activ-
ity such as cooperative or competitive activities.
ie. subordinated (sub-)activities, such as plan-
ning, problem solving, interaction with other
agents (goal-oriented dialog) and so on. On
the logical point of view, the rationality of
the involved agents is rendered by a coherent
mental state and by the notion of rational action
(Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Sadek, 1994). For
example, the beliefs and intentions of an agent
form a consistent set and agent’s actions are also
consistent with his beliefs and intentions. At the
first glance, the coherence of action with beliefs
seems to be irrefutable. However, to the extend
that the success of a subordinated activity is
governed by the generalization of the sufficient
criterion and on the basis of preceding arguments,
one may reasonably assume that agents’ rational-
ity does not strictly imply the coherence between
the actions being parts of a subordinated activity
and the beliefs states of the involved agents. For
these reasons, conceptual pact match better with
acceptance and modeling conceptual pacts by
collective acceptance insure the rationality of
team members. However, agent’s rationality is
contingent on the motivational context and on the
context of mental states of dialog partners.
2.3 The philosophical notion of Collective
Acceptance
Studies on dialog modeling as a collaborative ac-
tivity address the philosophical problem of de-
termining the type of mental states which could
be ascribed to team members. Based on the ob-
servation that sometimes one may encounter sit-
uations where one has to make judgements or
has to produce utterances that are contrary to
ones privately held beliefs, philosophers, such
has (Cohen, 1992), have introduced the notion of
(Collective) Acceptance, which is an intentional
social mental attitude. (Collective) Acceptances
have the following properties, in contrast with be-
liefs (Wray, 2001):
• They are voluntary (or intentional);
• They holds on utility or success (thus we can
accept something we believe false);
• They does not required justifications;
• All or nothing: we decide to accept or not to
accept.
In J.L. Cohen’s famous book, ”An essay on be-
lief and acceptance” (Cohen, 1992), the author ar-
gue that the conversational implicature ”a person’s
saying that p implies that this person believes p”
is not the rule and that speech acts such as con-
cessions, acknowledgements, agreements and ad-
missions that p do not imply the existence of the
corresponding belief. In such cases, ”I thereby ac-
cept that p” means that ”I take that proposition as
a premiss for any relevant decision or argument”
(Cohen, 1992). In previous work (Saget, 2006),
we claim that an act of reference using a particu-
lar description ıx.descr(x) of an object o does not
imply that the speaker believes that ıo.descr(o)
holds, but implies that the speaker believes that
this description enables the addressee to pick out
the correct intented referent.
3 Formal part
3.1 The dialog model
Rational models, based on
(Cohen and Levesque, 1990), can be consid-
ered as a logical reformulation of plan-based
models. They integrate, in more, a precise for-
malization of dialog partners’ mental states (their
beliefs, choices (or desires) and intentions), of
the rational balance which relates mental attitudes
between them and relates mental attitudes with
agents’ acts. Moreover, dialogue acts’ precondi-
tions and effects are expressed in terms of dialog
partners’ mental states. Thus, this is hopeful to
model precisely mental attitudes.
The chosen model is based on the rational
model proposed by D. Sadek (Sadek, 1994),
extending (Cohen and Levesque, 1990), which
rests upon a set of principles (axiom schemas)
of which dialog acts are branched off. A dialog
system is considered as a cognitive agent which is
rational and have a cooperative attitude towards
other agents (as the dialog system’s users) and this
agent is able to communicate with other agents.
Mental states (beliefs, intentions,...) and actions
are formalized in a first-order modal logic. In the
following of the paper, the symbols ¬,∧,∨,⇒
stand for the connectors of the classical logic
(respectively negation, conjunction, disjunction
and implication); ∀,∃ stand for the universal and
existential quantificators; p stands for a closed
formula denoting a proposition; i, j denote agents
and φ is a formula schemata. We only need to
introduce here two mental attitudes, belief and
intention:
Bi(p) stands for ”i (implicitly) believes
(that) p”,
Ii(p) stands for ”i intends to bring about p”.
Action expressions can be formed with
primitive acts: with (a1; a2) which stands for
sequential action (where a1 and a2 are action
expressions) and with (a1|a2) which stands for
non-deterministic choice.
Done(a, p): ”a has just taken place, and p
was true before that”
Done(a) = Done(a, true)
The model of communicative acts is:
< i, TypeOfCommunicativeAct(j, φ) >
FP: ”Feasible Preconditions”: the conditions
which must be satisfied in order to plan the
act;
PE: ”Perlocutionary Effect”: the reason for
which the act is selected.
For example, the communicative model of ”i in-
forming j that p” is:
< i, INFORM(j, φ) >
FP: Bi(φ) ∧ ¬Bi(Bj(φ))
PE: Bj(φ)
In this model, utterance generation and under-
standing, and thus referential acts are considered
as individual acts. Furthermore, the perlocution-
ary effects are considered as achieved as soon as
the communicative act has been performed.
So dialog and reference treatment are not
considered as collaborative activities. In order to
do so, notably, the set of mental attitudes has to be
extended with notions such as collective intention
and mutual belief.
There is no consensus on the definition of
collaboration. We consider that a group of agents
is engaged in a collaborative activity as soon as
they share a collective intention.
CollInti,j(φ) stands for ”i and j collec-
tively intends to bring about p, on i’s point of
view”.
MBi,j(φ) stands for ”φ is a shared belief
between agents i and j, on i’s point of view” and
mutual beliefs are formalized as:
MBi,j(φ) ≡ Beli(φ ∧MBelj,i(φ))
Furthermore, Collective Acceptance have to be
included.
3.2 Collective Acceptance
We propose the following formalization of the
philosophical notion of Collective Acceptance:
• CollAccij(φ) stands for ”φ is a collective ac-
ceptation between agents i and j, on i’s point
of view”
• Collective Acceptance is an intentional atti-
tude, ie. it comes from individual acts of in-
volved agents:
((∃α, β ∈ {i, j}).
Done(Propαβ(φ)) ∧Done(Acceptβα(φ)))
⇒ CollAccij(φ)
where:
– Propij(φ) stands for ”i proposes j to
consider φ”
– Acceptji(φ) stands for ”j accepts to
consider φ (towards i)”
– Propij(φ) and Acceptji(φ) are individ-
ual actions.
• A proposition involves a social obligation to
react:
Done(Propi,j(φ))
⇒ (Ij(Done((
Acceptj,i(φ)
|(Propj,i(φ
′))
|(requestj,i(Propi,j(φ
′′)))))
∧((φ′ 6= φ) ∧ (φ′′ 6= φ)))
Following (Boella et al., 2000), we consider that
social obligations as pro-attitudes are not required
and that an anticipatory coordination takes place
on the speaker’s point of view. This phenomenon
is govern by a social rule, acquired during pre-
ceding social interaction. This social rule is tran-
scribed by repeated use through a reaction to the
realization of a particular action (on the speaker’s
point of view) and through a reaction to the obser-
vation of an event which is the occurrence of a par-
ticular action (on the addressee’s point of view).
Since, reaction is a unintentional action, we have
to extend the kind of action of the basic model. In
fact, this model only considers what we name in-
tentional actions. Intentional actions of an agent
are those generated by a chain of intention, in our
model they are generated by the activation of the
rational axiom (Sadek, 1994):
Ii(p) ⇒ Ii(Done(a1 ∨ · · · ∨ an))
The intention of an agent, to achieve a given
goal, generates the intention that one of the
acts, which satisfies the following conditions,
be performed:
1. (∃x)Bi(ak = x) ≡ Brefi(ak):
the agent i knows the action ak,
2. EPak = p and
3. ¬Ii(¬Possible(Done(ak)))
Reactions have to be added. Reactions of an
agent are defined as those generated by the activa-
tion of such axiom:
φ⇒ Ii(Done(a1 ∨ · · · ∨ an))
where φ is the result of the perception of an
event or an action’s occurrence.
4 Model of Reference as a collaborative
activity
4.1 Model of Referential Act
In order to model dialog as a collaboration, refer-
ence treatment has to be considered at the speech
act level (Cohen and Levesque, 1994), as it is done
in A. Kronfeld’s work (Kronfeld, 1990).3
In order to integrate Collective Acceptance in
reference, we propose an extension of an ex-
isting model of referential acts based on A.
Kronfeld’s work in the rational model used
(Bretier et al., 1995). The act of reference from an
agent i to another agent j, using the conceptual-
ization x (which corresponds to the semantics of
the referential expression) to refer to the object y
is formalized as:
< i,REFER(j, x, o) >
FP: Ii(referi,j(o)) ∧Brefi(o);
EP: Bj((∃o)Ii(referi,j(o)))
∧ Ij(Brefj(o))
∧ RepSameObj(o, o′)
∧ Done(Propi,j(referBy(x, o)))
∧Bj(Done(Propi,j(referBy(x, o))))
where:
– o et o′ are object mental representations;
3For a computational implementation is provided in
(Jorgensen, 2000).
– Ii(referi,j(o)) stands for ”a commu-
nicative intention of i to refer to o, the
addressee is j”;
– RepSameObj(o, o′) stands for ”the
mental representations o and o′ repre-
sent the same object”;
– referedBy(D,R) stands for ”the de-
scription D refers to the referent R”.
Generating a referential expression is considered
as the generation of an instance of such plan and
the interpretation of a particular referential expres-
sion as the recognition of an instance of such plan.
And the whole process is governed by two meta-
goal, on the speaker’s point of view 4:
CollIntij(MBij(Ii(referi,j(o)))) ∧
CollIntij((∃D)CollAccij(referedBy(D, o)))
4.2 Return to the example
Let’s consider the example shown in 2.1, the task
level and the conversational level have to be sep-
arated 5. In uttering (U1), Tom wants to make a
necessary choice for the meeting task, such as :
ITom((∃l)MBelTom,Laura(meetingP lace = l))
Tom makes his choice: his mental representation
of the restaurant chosen is o. In order to realize his
preceding intention, he has get through to Laura:
ITom(referTom,Laura(l))
Remaining the goal of referential acts (2.1), the
choice of the description of the intented place is
guided by its capacity to enable Laura to pick out,
in her mental state, the mental representation of
the correct place. That is, the description enables
Laura to isolate the correct mental representation
from other possible ones, with sufficient evidence
of mutuality. This is a pragmatic (ie. contextual)
guideline, which corresponds to the Identification
goal.
Thus, Tom produces a description of the
intended place: ”the restaurant where we have
been yet”. He thinks that Laura is able to identify
the correct place basing on the description, ie.
he thinks that she is able to realize the following
intention:
4On the addressee point of view, it is govern by dual goals
with existential quantifier.
5Further details may be found in(Saget, 2006).
Identification task:
ILaura(BrefLaura(l
′) ∧RepSameObj(o, o′))
But, Laura is not able to pick out a single place:
there is other restaurants, where they have been
together. Moreover, Laura has to answer to Tom’s
proposition:
BLaura(Done(PropTom,Laura(referedBy(ıx.φ(x), l
′))).
She is obliged to reply to his proposition by the
social rule. Besides, the precondition of accepting
a conceptual pact is to have realized the Identifica-
tion goal; otherwise, the addressee has the choice
between other possible reactions. As Laura failed
to succeed, she chooses to ask for clarification in
(U2):
requestLaura,Tom
(PropTom,Laura(referedBy(ıx.φ
′(x), l′))).
∧(φ′ 6= φ)
In order to achieve understanding, by a coopera-
tive attitude, Tom realizes Laura’s request in (U3).
Laura is now able to pick out a single mental rep-
resentation of the place. She likes it, so she agrees.
The social goal obliges Laura to react to Tom’s
new proposition. As the precondition of accept-
ing is fulfilled, with uttering (U4), Laura realizes
the following intention:
Done(AcceptLaura,Tom(referedBy(ıx.φ
′(x), l′))).
Finally, following Collective Acceptance’s defini-
tion, a conceptual pact is created:
CollAccLaura,Tom(referedBy(ıx.φ
′(x), l′).
As well as, mutual understanding:
MBLaura,Tom(ITom(referTom,Laura(l
′)),
and the coordination on the task level:
MBelLaura,Tom(meetingP lace = l
′)).
5 Conclusion
Modeling dialog as a collaborative activity
consists notably in specifying the content of the
Conversational Common Ground and the kind
of social mental state involved. Even if mutual
beliefs, or weaker forms of belief states, do not
rise to inconsistencies, but, are still sufficiently
strong for the participants to have successful
cooperation or coordination of actions. Epistemic
states involve computational treatments with high
complexity.
We show that modeling the CCG by an
epistemic state is neither necessary, nor proper.
Considering only genuine conceptual pacts limits
the capacity of interaction and may leads to ”real”
communicative errors.
We have proposed a formalization of Collective
Acceptance, furthermore, elements haven been
given in order to integrate this attitude in a rational
model of dialog. Finally, a model of referential
acts as being part of a collaborative activity has
been provided.
Further studies will hold on the extension
of the general principles proposed to the dialog
itself. Moreover, collective acceptance is a
particularly interesting attitude because it allows
to model reference and dialog itself as situated
activities in an elegant manner. Finally, this
concept may provide symbolic elements in order
to form the grounding criterion, which is a notion
especially hard to make up, because this criterion
is highly context dependant. Grounding criterion
differs depending on the people involved, the
domain concerned and so on.
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